Abstract-In early stage, the Byzantine agreement (BA) problem was studied with single faults on processors in either a fully connected network or a nonfully connected network. Subsequently, the single fault assumption was extended to mixed faults (also referred to as hybrid fault model) on processors. For the case of both processor and link failures, the problem has been examined in a fully connected network with a single faulty type, namely an arbitrary fault. To release the limitations of a fully connected network and a single faulty type, the problem is reconsidered in a general network. The processors and links in such a network can both be subjected to different types of fault simultaneously. The proposed protocol uses the minimum number of message exchanges and can tolerate the maximum number of allowable faulty components to make each fault-free processor reach an agreement.
INTRODUCTION
EACHING agreement in the presence of faults is one of the most important problems in designing a fault-tolerant distributed system. Achieving such a goal is called the Byzantine Agreement (BA) problem [13] , [18] , and the goal of the BA is to make the fault-free processors reach a common agreement, even if certain components (both processors and links) fail. The common agreement of fault-free processors should be free from the influence of the faulty components. With the common agreement, some applications can then be achieved. Some examples are data processing in a distributed database system [17] , or the clock synchronization problem [4] .
In practice, most of the network topologies may not be fully connected. Processors and links can both be subjected to different types of failures simultaneously, also referred to as the hybrid fault model [14] , [16] , [24] . A fault-free processor does not know which component in the network is faulty. We call such a network model a general network. However, none of the existing protocols is designed for solving the BA problem in a general network [2] , [3] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [9] , [13] , [14] , [16] , [24] , [27] . Table 1 summarizes the assumptions of the relevant BA protocols.
As indicated in Table 1 , the two broad classes of processor faults, namely arbitrary and dormant, are termed by Meyer and Pradhan [16] . An arbitrary fault can exhibit arbitrary (including malicious) behavior, while a dormant fault reflects the case when faults consists merely of omission of messages or delay in sending or relaying messages.
In the arbitrary-resilient BA protocols [9] , [13] , all faults are treated as arbitrary faults, even though some faults may be subjected to dormant faults, such as crash or fail-stop faults. This treatment ignores that the faulty behaviors of dormant faults is better than that of arbitrary faults. When a dormant fault exhibits its faulty behavior, it can be detected and ignored by all fault-free processors. Thus, the arbitraryresilient BA protocols cannot tolerate the maximum number of faults if the dormant faults maybe existed. On the other hand, the protocols proposed by Christian et al. [7] for dormant faults cannot cope with the arbitrary faults. These observations motivate the study of the BA problem under a hybrid fault model [14] , [16] , [24] . The goal of [14] , [16] , [24] is to maximize the number of allowable faulty processors when hybrid fault model is considered.
In a fully connected network with reliable communication links, Lincoln and Rushby [14] proposed the OMH protocol for solving the BA problem under a hybrid fault model. This protocol is the corrected version of Thambidurai and Park's Z protocol [24] . Both protocols assume that the number of processors subjected to arbitrary faults must be known prior to the execution of the protocols. However, this requirement violates the general assumption of the BA problemthat a fault-free processor does not know which component is faulty [14] . Moreover, Shin and Ramanathan [21] found that it is impractical to run diagnostics to detect all arbitrary faults in a network. Furthermore, Meyer and Pradhan [16] also indicated that this kind of protocol is unable to reach an agreement among processors when the number of arbitrary faults is overestimated (or underestimated).
Meyer and Pradhan [16] proposed two protocols, MIXED and MIXED-SUM, for solving the BA problem with hybrid fault model on processors. They are designed for any network topology. The MIXED protocol, similar to the OMH protocol, still requires that the number of arbitrary faults must be known prior to the execution of the protocol, while the goal of the MIXED-SUM protocol is to remove such a limitation. They stated that their protocol can tolerate any fault in a system, provided
, where n is the total number of processors, c is the system connectivity, P a is the number of arbitrary faults, and P d is the number of dormant faults. Under a hybrid fault model, these are the optimal constraints on failures for the BA problem. However, the bound on the number of allowable faulty processors, namely n P P a d
, for the MIXED-SUM protocol is overestimated. 1 The main reason of the overestimation is that the traditional majority vote is used by MIXED-SUM for handling the hybrid fault model. In order to reach the optimal bound on number of faults, therefore, a new voting method should be proposed for solving the BA problem under a hybrid fault model. Most of the earlier work for the BA problem is designed for handling the processor failures only [7] , [9] , [13] , [14] , [16] , [24] , as indicated in Table 1 . In practice, however, a link can also fail [16] , [19] , [20] , [26] , [27] . Martin [15] found that links throughout the world occasionally failed. Therefore, many algorithms have been proposed to diagnose the link failures [1] , [20] . For example, in the Common Channel Signaling (CCS) network, based on Signaling System No. 7 (SS7), protocol has a dedicated algorithm to monitor the error of communication links [20] . Traditionally, such a link fault was treated as a processor fault [24] . The treatment ignores the fact that the processor connected with the faulty link is fault-free (i.e., called innocent processor [27] ); hence, an innocent processor does not involve an agreement under the treatment. Such a treatment contradicts the definition of the BA problem that requires all faultfree processors to reach an agreement. From this standpoint, a link failure should be treated differently from the case of a processor failure.
Similar to the discussion of processor faults, the type of link failures can also be classified with respect to the behavior of the failure into two disjoint sets: dormant and arbitrary fault. The content of a message may be dropped, but is not contaminated by the dormant faulty link. On the other hand, an arbitrary faulty link may exhibit unrestrained behaviors. Although several protocols have been proposed for 1 . We found that the correct constraint on number of processors required is n n P P
solving the BA problem with the assumption on link failures (link failures only [26] or both processor and link failures [27] ), these protocols consider fully connected networks with arbitrary faults only. Hence, when these protocols are applied to Fig. 1 , an agreement still cannot be reached among the fault-free processors.
The BA problem is reexamined in a general network. The proposed protocol can solve the BA problem with the following assumptions: 1) Each fault-free processor does not require prior information of the system's faulty status.
2) The network topology is not necessarily fully connected. 3) Both processors and links are subjected to mixed faults in the network.
The protocol designed for solving the BA problem in a general network is called a generalized protocol for the BA problem (GPBA). GPBA uses the minimum number of message exchanges to make each fault-free processor reach a common agreement. The number of tolerable faulty components of GPBA is greater than that of the existing protocols when the general network is considered.
THE DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT
The BA problem is considered in a synchronous network. In such a network, the bounds on the processing and communication delays of fault-free components are finite [10] , [23] , [25] . Therefore, a processor executing the proposed protocol will have received correct messages from all other fault-free processors at a predictable point in time. In contrast, Fischer et al. [12] found that agreement in an asynchronous network is impossible even if only one processor has failed, and the failure is a crash failure. Therefore, a synchronous network is assumed. The parameters in a synchronous network are assumed as follows:
• N: The set of all processors, the processor's identifier is unique, and n = |N|.
• S: The source, and S ∈ N.
• V: The set of all possible values.
• v s : The initial value of S to be broadcast to all other processors, and v s ∈V. • c: The connectivity of the underlying network. Due to the Menger theorem [8] , at least c disjoint paths exist between any pairs of processors S and R if the connectivity of the network is c. For any two paths, the only common components are S and R.
• P a : The number of processors subjected to the arbitrary fault.
• P d : The number of processors subjected to the dormant fault.
• L a : The number of links subjected to the arbitrary fault.
• L d : The number of links subjected to the dormant fault.
• ∅, A, RA i : These values are used to remove the influence of a faulty processor that does not send its messages; the formal descriptions of these values will be presented in Section 3, and ∅, A, and RA i ∉ V, where
Let processor S be the source and v s be the initial value of S to be broadcast to all other processors. The goal of GPBA is to make each fault-free processor agree on a common value broadcast by the source. After the execution of GPBA, the common value of the fault-free processors shall be the value defined in the following conditions: 1) Agreement: All fault-free processors agree on the same common value v, and 2) Validity: If the source is fault-free, then the common value v should be the initial value v s of the source, i.e., v v s = .
In a general network, a processor does not know the faulty status of another component, each processor requires t + 1 rounds to exchange the messages for reaching an agreement [13] , where t n = -( ) 1 3 . Fischer et al. [11] also pointed out that the t + 1 rounds are the minimum number of message exchange rounds required to have an agreement when the network's faulty status is unknown. Therefore, the minimum number of rounds required by GPBA is t + 1.
Essentially, the fault tolerance capabilities of a network depend on the total number of processors and the network topology (connectivity) [9] . For example, every faulty component can prevent the fault-free processors from achieving an agreement if the network topology is a bus. To generalize, the complete characterizations of constraints on failures for every network are discussed below. The Byzantine agreement can be achieved in a network if:
The first constraint specifies the number of processors required. After the influences of the dormant faulty processors are removed, an agreement can be reached if
, as stated in [16] . On the other hand, the second constraint specifies the required connectivity. In each message exchange round, every processor sends its message to other processors. In order to decide whether a processor has sent out its message, the total number of link failures must be less than half of c P P
Otherwise, such a goal cannot be reached. Thus, the conditions for achieving an agreement in a general network can be proven (due to the limited space, the proofs of the lemmas and theorems in the paper are omitted). THEOREM 1. For any network, a protocol for the BA problem does exist if n P P a d
From the above observation, the types of link failures can be treated as a single failure type. For ease of discussion, we still use the classification of link failures. By Theorem 1, the maximum number allowable of faulty compo-
) , as stated in Theorem 1. When the number of processors and the connectivity is two or less, there is no problem reaching an agreement [13] ; hence, n > 2 and c > 2 are assumed.
BASIC CONCEPT AND APPROACHES
In a general network, a processor can be played as a sender, receiver, or relay, depending on the flow of a message. A message sent from a sender to a receiver may be passed through some intermedium (relay processors and links). The message may be contaminated by either the sender (dormant or arbitrary fault), some intermedium, or both. In order to solve the BA problem in such a network model, GPBA therefore should completely remove the influence caused by these faulty components. In order to reduce the number of message exchange rounds required, as stated in [14] , [16] , [24] , [27] , GPBA removes the influence caused by a faulty intermedium first, then removes the influence caused by a dormant faulty sender and, finally, removes the influence caused by an arbitrary faulty sender.
GPBA is based on the oral message model [13] . There are two phases in GPBA: the message exchange phase and the decision making phase. The message exchange phase consists of ( ) n -+ 1 3 1 rounds to collect the messages and the decision making phase computes the common value for an agreement, as shown in Fig. 2 . GPBA combines the following approaches to solve the BA problem in a general network:
• The fault-tolerant virtual channel (FTVC) protocol:
At the start of the kth round of message exchange, say r k -, each sender uses FTVC to broadcast its messages to all receivers, as shown in Fig. 2 . The goal of FTVC is to remove the influence caused by a faulty intermedium. That means FTVC provides a reliable communication mechanism in a general network so that the message passing in such a network is similar to that in a fully connected network with fault-free communication links. Each receiver collects all of the senders' messages that are free from the influences of a faulty intermedium when FTVC is applied, say r k , as shown in Fig. 2 .
• The absent rule: The absent rule is applied at the end of the kth round, namely r k + , to remove the influence of the dormant faulty sender, as shown in Fig. 2 . Obviously, if a sender has a dormant fault, all fault-free receivers can detect such a fault (no message was received from it) during the entire message exchange phase or at some message exchange rounds. Once a faulty sender is detected, a fault-free receiver will ignore the messages received from it in every subsequent message exchange round.
• The voting function VOTE: When the number of rounds reaches ( ) n -+ 1 3 1, the number of received messages collected is enough to remove the influence of an arbitrary faulty sender and to make each fault-free processor able to reach an agreement through a voting scheme VOTE taken in the decision making phase, as shown in Fig. 2 .
As for the data structure used to collect the messages, each fault-free processor maintains a tree structure, called the Information Gathering tree (IG-tree) [5] , of level t + 1, for collecting the received messages. Fig. 3 illustrates the structure of an IG-tree for the network shown in Fig. 2 . After the first message exchange round, each fault-free receiver stores the message received from the source, denoted as val(S), at the root S of its IG-tree. In the second round, each sender broadcasts the root's value of its IG-tree to all receivers. If sender B sends a message val(S) to receiver A, A will store the message received from B, denoted as val(SB), at vertex SB of its IG-tree. The vertex SB is said to correspond to the sender B. Note that each level of an IG-tree contains a round of received messages and each vertex is labeled by a nonrepeating sequence of processor identifiers. Because the label of an IG-tree is nonrepeating, the root (labeled by the source) has n -1 children and a vertex at the tth level has n -t leaves, as shown in Fig. 3 . No repeating processor identifier can avoid the recursive influences made by a faulty processor. 4 shows an example of GPBA used by a fault-free processor, say A, in the network shown in Fig. 1 (the execution in the other fault-free processors is similar). Suppose that the dormant faulty processor G does not send any messages during the entire execution of the protocol. In the first round of message exchange, the source S uses FTVC to send c (= 6) copies of its initial value "1" to each receiver. Each fault-free receiver can receive the message "1" sent by S after the majority function MAJ is applied to the c received messages, and store the message into the root of its IG-tree, as shown in Fig. 4a . To remove the influence of a dormant faulty sender, each fault-free receiver then applies the absent rule to the root of its IG-tree as shown in Fig. 4b . Since the source is not in dormant fault, the value stored at the root in each fault-free receiver is unchanged after the absent rule is applied. Figs. 4c and 4d show the second round of message exchange. Using FTVC to exchange the messages, each fault-free receiver stores the messages received from all senders into the second level of its IG-tree, as shown in Fig. 4c . Note that the value stored at vertex SG in the IG-tree of each fault-free receiver is ∅. That means a fault-free receiver does not receive any messages from G and uses the value ∅ to represent the message of G. After the absent rule is applied, each fault-free receiver will use the value A to replace the messages received from G as shown in Fig. 4d . Value A will then be relayed to all processors as value RA 1 and value RA j will be relayed to all processors as value RA j+1 , where 1 £ < j t (the meanings of value A and RA j are discussed in Section 3.2). When the number of rounds reaches three (= ( ) n -+ 1 3 1 = ( ) 9 1 3 1 -+ ), the messages are collected by each fault-free processor as shown in Fig. 4e . Finally, each fault-free processor applies the function VOTE onto its IG-tree for computing the common value for an agreement as shown in Fig. 4f . Note that the value A (excluding the last round) is not counted during the time the VOTE is taken. The common value "1" can be reached among the faultfree processors after VOTE is applied.
The detailed descriptions of the above steps for removing the influence caused by the multiple faulty components are presented as follows.
Step 1: Removing the Influence of a Faulty
Intermedium The function of FTVC is to remove the influence caused by the faulty intermedium between any pairs of processors. We first consider the case of a single sender S and a single receiver R. S uses FTVC to send its message m to R. Solving this case successfully will enable us to solve the general case in which every sender sends its message to every receiver.
Due to the Menger theorem [8] , at least c disjoint paths exist between S and R if the connectivity of the network is c. Hence, S is able to send c copies of its messages through c disjoint paths to R. The c disjoint paths between S and R can be predefined, as stated in [9] , [16] , and the paths information is distributed onto the relay processors between S and R. The detailed description of the paths information is presented in Appendix A. According to the paths information, a relay processor receives the message (R, S, m) from the predefined immediate predecessor and sends the message to the predefined immediate successor. Since the network is synchronous, the predefined immediate successor P of S should have the message sent by S after the predefined time interval [12] ; otherwise, it knows that either S, the link L SP , or both are faulty. When P receives no message from S, it will relay the symbol ∅ (∆ oe V ) to its immediate successor along the predefined disjoint path between S and R to reflect the faulty status. These are the concepts of the transferring rules obeyed by each relay processor. The goal of the transferring rules is to make the receiver obtain the correct message sent, directly or indirectly, by the sender. The formal definition of the transferring rules is presented in Appendix B. The properties of path information and transfer rules can be found in current network path components such as ATM-based networks.
By the definition of the transferring rules, normally, R receives only one S's message from a path between S and R. If more than one message is received from a path in a message exchange round, then all messages received from the path are discarded. This method can handle the case of the faulty components to fake the messages of predecesors. Therefore, R receives at most c messages sent by S. An arbitrary faulty intermedium between S and R can influence, at most, one message of these c messages sent by S, and a dormant faulty intermedium between S and R can drop, at most, one message of these c messages sent by S. In the worst case, R will receive c P L
--copies of messages sent by S. By applying the majority vote MAJ to these messages, R can determine the message sent by S if the constraint on connectivity, namely c
2 ( ) , holds. MAJ has three possible outcomes:
• Case 1: m, if S is fault-free.
• Case 2: ∅, if S does not send the message to R.
• Case 3: Arbitrary value, if S has an arbitrary fault.
In Case 1, R can receive the message m sent by the faultfree sender S when MAJ is applied to the receiver messages. If S does not send the message to R (Case 2), R will use ∅ as the message sent by S because the major number of c P L d d
--copies of messages is ∅. The third outcome of MAJ implies that the received message is not only contaminated by the faulty intermedium, but also is contaminated by the arbitrary faulty sender. FTVC is unable to remove the influence of such a case; hence such an outcome of MAJ shall be an arbitrary value.
In [9] , [16] , the alternative approaches are proposed to remove the influence caused by a faulty intermedium in a nonfully connected network. The approach of [9] assumes that a faulty processor is only subjected to arbitrary faults and a link is fault-free. This approach is inappropriate for hybrid fault model on both processors and links. In [16] , an approach for handling hybrid fault model only on processors is proposed. When a receiver cannot determine whether the sender did send a message (regular message) to it, it will send the inquiry messages to the sender and will wait for the denial messages from the sender to verify the status of the sender. Hence, the length of time occupied by each round of this approach is three times than that of FTVC, which only requires the time for regular message passing.
Step 2: Removing the Influence of a Dormant
Faulty Sender The second step of GPBA is to remove the influence of a dormant faulty sender. Each fault-free sender should send its messages to all receivers in each round of the message exchange phase. As mentioned in Section 3.1, a receiver can therefore detect that a sender is faulty if no message is received from the sender (the output of MAJ of FTVC is ∅).
In the first round, the source should broadcast its initial value v s to all receivers; therefore, a fault-free receiver R can always detect that the source is faulty if no message is received from it. In order to satisfy the Agreement condition of the BA problem [13] agreement should be reached by every fault-free processor even if no message was sent from the source-R will select the default value, say 0, to replace the source's message if no message is received from the source.
In each subsequent round, these n -1 receivers (except the source) should exchange the message received from the source to compute a common value. A fault-free receiver R can detect that a sender S is faulty if no message was received from S. If R receives no message from S at the rth round, all messages received from S (directly) at the rth round and the subsequent rounds will be replaced by value A, and this value will be relayed to all processors as value RA 1 . In each subsequent round, the value RA j will be relayed to all processors as value RA j+1 ( A oe V and ∀i, RA i V oe ). Semantically, the value A is represented as an absentee vote, while sender S is treated as an absentee. Hence, the voting ticket of S is ignored during the decision-making phase. Value RA i will be interpreted as the ith time an absent vote reported. R will report to all processors that S is an absentee; thus, S has no influence on the others when the voting function VOTE is taken in decision-making phase. The approach can be formalized as follows:
Absent rule: (AR1) When R receives no message directly from S in the rth round, then 1) if r = 1 (the first round), P will select the default value to replace the incoming message from S (the source); or 2) if r π 1, all messages received from S at the rth round and any subsequent rounds will be replaced by value A, and this value will be relayed to all processors (except the transmitter) as value RA 1 .
(AR2) When R receives the value RA j , it will relay the value RA j+1 to all processors (if any).
Step 3: Removing the Influence of an Arbitrary
Faulty Sender After the message exchange phase, the messages collected in a fault-free receiver's IG-tree are free from the influence of the faulty intermedium and the dormant faulty sender. However, the messages are still contaminated by the arbitrary faulty senders. In order to reach an agreement, such an influence shall also be removed in the decision making phase. As mentioned in Section 1, the traditional majority vote is inappropriate in a general network. As a result, we propose a new voting scheme VOTE to remove the influence of the arbitrary faulty senders.
By the constraint on the number of processors required, namely n P P -+ + = + , where P a ≥ 1. This phenomenon can be used by VOTE to remove the influence of an arbitrary faulty sender. The basic concept of VOTE is as follows: Let P be a fault-free processor and σ be a vertex at the ith level of P's IG-tree, 1 £ £ i t. If P detects that
n children of σ have value A, it will use the original value stored at σ, namely val(σ), as the output of VOTE for removing the influence of the arbitrary faulty sender as in the above discussion; otherwise, it will use the majority value of children of σ as the output of VOTE.
VOTE is always correct if vertex σ corresponds to a faultfree or a dormant faulty sender, since each fault-free receiver has the same message sent by the sender. On the other hand, if vertex σ corresponds to an arbitrary faulty sender Q, the output of VOTE may be contaminated by Q after our approach is applied (Q cooperates with other arbitrary faulty senders to prevent the fault-free processors from achieving a common value). However, the influence of Q can still be removed at the upper level voting if n P P
. Therefore, the fault-free processors can reach an agreement through the concept of democratic voting, as shown in Theorem 3. Appendix C presents the formal definition of VOTE.
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF GPBA
GPBA uses the approaches stated in Section 3 to remove the multiply faulty components, and these approaches can be presented as the following primitives:
• FTVC_SEND(m, Q): Send the message m to processor Q by using the FTVC protocol.
• FTVC_RECEIVE(m, Q): Receive the message m from processor Q by using the FTVC protocol.
• ABSENT_RULE(r): Apply the absent rule to the rth level of the IG-tree.
• VOTE (s): Apply the function VOTE to vertex s.
For completeness, some additional primitives should be presented as follows:
• CREATE(σQ, v): Create the vertex σQ, and set val(σQ) = v.
• FOLD(r, m): Fold the rth level of the IG-tree to the message m.
• UNFOLD(m, r): According the structure of the rth level of the IG-tree, unfold the message.
• OUTPUT(v): Output the value v.
Using the above primitives, the formal procedure of GPBA can be stated as follows.
Protocol GPBA (for each processor P) begin /* Message Exchange Phase */ /* The first round */ if P = S /* the source S*/
end; /* round 2 to round t + 1 */ for r = 2 to t + 1 do begin FOLD(r -1, m) ;
CREATE(σQ, v) end end; ABSENT_RULE(r) end; /* Decision Making Phase */ VOTE(S); Output(val(S)) end.
Correctness
The goal of GPBA is to make each fault-free processor reach a common value for an agreement; hence, the correctness of GPBA can be proven from the fact that the common value of each fault-free processor satisfies the conditions of Agreement and Validity. To reach an agreement in a general network, each fault-free processor should be insulated from the influence of all faulty components. The basic concept of proving the correctness of GPBA is as follows: By using FTVC, GPBA first removes the influence of a faulty intermedium. Then, it makes each fault-free processor reach an agreement after the influence of the faulty sender is removed (both arbitrary and dormant faults).
To prove the correctness of FTVC, the output of MAJ should be proven to be free from the influence of a faulty intermedium. Hence, we shall prove that a fault-free receiver can receive the message sent by a fault-free sender or can detect that the sender did not send a message to it.
LEMMA 1. Using FTVC, a fault-free receiver R can receive the message m sent by a fault-free sender S if c > 2P
a + P d + 2(L a + L d ).
LEMMA 2. Using FTVC, a fault-free receiver R can detect that the sender S does not send a message to it if c > 2P
THEOREM 2. FTVC does remove the influence of a faulty intermedium in a general
Then, we prove that GPBA makes each fault-free processor reach an agreement. Since GPBA is based on the oral message model, some concepts and terminologies used by [5] are used here. A vertex σ is called common [5] if the value stored at σ of each fault-free processor's IG-tree is identical. In other words, a common value for an agreement can be reached if the root of each fault-free processor's IG-tree is common. If every root-to-leaf of an IG-tree contains a common vertex, then the collection of the common vertices forms a common frontier [5] . To prove an agreement can be reached by GPBA, we define the consistent vertex as follows.
Vertex α (= σi) at a fault-free receiver's IG-tree is a consistent vertex if sender i is fault-free or in dormant fault. By the behavior of i, all fault-free receivers receive the identical message sent by i. Although a receiver does not know which vertex is consistent, the consistent vertices do exist since some senders in the network are fault-free or dormant faulty.
The following lemma proves that all consistent vertices of an IG-tree are common: By the frontier lemma of [5] , the root of the fault-free processor's IG-tree is common if the common frontier exists on each fault-free processor's IG-tree. The following theorems prove that an agreement can be reached among each fault-free processor. 
Complexity
The complexity of GPBA is defined in terms of 1) the number of rounds required, 2) the number of messages required, and 3) the number of faulty components allowed.
In this subsection, we prove that GPBA is optimal. It uses the minimum number of rounds and messages to tolerate the maximum number of faulty components. 
CONCLUSION
GPBA is a protocol for solving the BA problem in a general network. We have shown the conditions for an agreement in a general network, namely the number of processors required and the connectivity required. Since GPBA is based on general assumptions, the protocols designed for handling the processor failures only or link failures only are the special cases of GPBA, as summarized in Tables 2 and 3 . As for the assumptions on both processor and link failures, Yan et al.'s protocol [27] is also a special case of GPBA because their protocol considers arbitrary faults only, as indicated in Table 4 . When only link failures are considered, the constraint on
, as shown in Table 3 . The number of allowable faulty links of this bound is greater than that of the original bound on GPBA, namely c L L
).
According to FTVC, in the worst case, a fault-free processor has c L d -copies of messages sent by a sender. Therefore, the influence of faulty links can be removed by using FTVC if
. Since the processors are fault-free, by the condition c3 of VOTE, an agreement can be reached among the processors.
From the previous discussion, we can present the following results: 1) Solving the BA problem in a general network, GPBA is optimal in terms of the number of rounds required, the number of messages required, and the number of faulty components allowable, as proven in Theorems 6 and 7. 2) GPBA does not require the faulty status of the system prior to the execution of the protocol.
3) GPBA is designed for solving the BA problem with the most general assumptions; all others failure types can be treated as the special cases as shown in Tables 2,  3 , and 4. 4) The FTVC protocol can remove the influence of a faulty intermedium. The protocol can be used in other problems of distributed systems, such as clock synchronization and replicated file system [3] , to provide a reliable communication mechanism.
By using the absent rule, a fault-free receiver can detect the faulty status of a sender. Thus, GPBA has the capability of fault detection. Basically, the fault detection can handle the dormant faults only and the result of fault detection is local [3] (the fault detection result is inconsistent among all fault-free processors). Our future work consists of combining GPBA with the fault detection for all types of failures in a general network. [14] n > 3P a N.A. n > 3P d N.A. n > 3(P a + P d ) N . A . Dolev [9] n > 3P a n > 3P a c > 2P a n > 3P d n > 3P d c > 2P d n > 3(P a + P d ) n > 3(P a + P d ) c > 2(P a + P d ) Christian et al. [7] n > 3P a N.A. n > P d N.A. n > 3(P a + P d ) N . A . Thambidurai and Park [24] n > 3P a N.A. n > P d N.A. n > 3P a + P d * N . A . Lincoln and Rushby [15] n > 3P a N.A. n > P d N.A. n > 3P a + P d * N . A .
Meyer and Pradhan [17] n > 3P a n > 3P a c > 2P a 
APPENDIX A Paths Information
The paths information of each sender and receiver pair is distributed onto the replay processors between sender and receiver. Each relay processor P maintains a tuple (receiver, sender, predecessor, successor) path information such that the path <predecessor, P, successor> is a subpath of the path from the sender to the receiver. The sender and receiver also need the c neighbors along a prescribed set of processor-disjoint paths. The sender will send c copies of the message formatted (receiver, sender, message) through the c predefined paths to the receiver at each time of message passing.
B The Transferring Rules
The transferring rules obeyed by a relay processor P are defined in the following:
R1: According to the paths information described above, P only relays a message to its predefined immediate successor if P receives it from its predefined immediate predecessor.
R2:
Let P be a predefined immediate successor of the sender S. After the time T T k SP + , if P does not receive a message from S, then P will relay the symbol ∅ to its predefined immediate successor, where T k is the starting time of the kth round of the message exchange phase, and T SP is the upper bound on communication time between S and P.
Semantically, R1 indicates that a fault-free relay processor only receives a message from the predefined immediate predecessor and only sends a message to the predefined immediate successor. R2 is proposed to help R to determine the status of S. At the time T SP after the starting time of the kth round, namely T T k SP + , the predefined immediate successor P of S should have the message sent by S; otherwise, it knows that either S, the link L SP , or both have failed. When P receives no message from S, it will relay the symbol ∅ to its predefined immediate successor to reflect the faulty status.
C VOTE
VOTE only counts the non-A values (excluding the last level of the IG-tree). For all vertex σ at the ith level of an IG-tree, the output of VOTE depends on the following conditions: c1: val(σ), if σ is a leaf; or c2: val(σ), if 1 ≤ i ≤ t and σ has at least 3 * (t -i + 1) + [(n -1) mod 3] children, each of which has value A; or c3: v, if 1 ≤ i ≤ t, σ has no more than 3 * (t -i + 1) + [(n -1) mod 3] children, each of which has value A, v is the most common value of VOTE applied to children of σ, and v ≠ RA i ; or c4: A, if 1 ≤ i ≤ t, σ has no more than 3 * (t -i + 1) + [(n -1) mod 3] children, each of which has value A, and RA 1 is the most common value of VOTE applied to children of σ; or c5: RA j-1 , if 1 ≤ i ≤ t, σ has no more than 3 * (t -i + 1) + [(n -1) mod 3] children, each of which has value A, and RA j is the most common value of VOTE applied to children of σ, where j π 1; or c6: the default value, if no majority value of children of σ exists.
Conditions c1, c3, c5, and c6 are similar to the traditional majority vote. The other two conditions are used to handle the case of mixed faults. Semantically, condition c4 is used to report the existence of an absentee. When the major number of processors reports that an absentee exists, VOTE returns the value A, an absentee's vote, to represent such an event. As mentioned in Section 3.3, VOTE uses val(σ) as the output if the condition of c2 is satisfied.
